The Agreement
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action regarding the I.R.of Iran’s Nuclear Program.
Below are the key
parameters of a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) regarding
the Islamic Republic ofIran’s nuclear program
that were decided in Lausanne, Switzerland. These elements form the
foundation upon which the final text of
the JCPOA will be written between now and June 30, and reflect the
significant progress that has been
made in discussions between the P5+1, the European Union, and Iran.
Important implementation
details are still subject to negotiation, and nothing is agreed until
everything is agreed. We will work to conclude
the JCPOA based on these parameters over the coming months.
Enrichment
* Iran has agreed to reduce
by approximately two-thirds its installed centrifuges. Iran will go
from having about 19,000 installed today to 6,104 installed under the
deal, with only 5,060 of these enriching uranium for 10 years. All
6,104 centrifuges will be IR-1s, Iran’s first-generation
centrifuge.
* Iran has agreed to not
enrich uranium over 3.67 percent for at least 15 years.
* Iran has agreed to reduce
its current stockpile of about 10,000 kg of low-enriched uranium
(LEU) to 300 kg of 3.67 percent LEU for 15 years.
* All excess centrifuges and
enrichment infrastructure will be placed in IAEA monitored storage
and will be used only as replacements for operating centrifuges and
equipment.
* Iran has agreed to not
build any new facilities for the purpose of enriching uranium for 15
years.
* Iran’s breakout timeline
– the time that it would take for Iran to acquire enough fissile
material for one weapon – is currently assessed to be 2 to 3
months. That timeline will be extended to at least one year, for a
duration of at least ten years, under this framework.
* Iran will convert its
facility at Fordow so that it is no longer used to enrich uranium
*Iran has agreed to not
enrich uranium at its Fordow facility for at least 15 years.
* Iran has agreed to convert
its Fordow facility so that it is used for peaceful purposes only –
into a nuclear, physics, technology, research center.
* Iran has agreed to not
conduct research and development associated with uranium enrichment
at Fordow for 15 years.
* Iran will not have any
fissile material at Fordow for 15 years
Almost two-thirds of
Fordow’s centrifuges and infrastructure will be removed. The
remaining centrifuges will not enrich uranium. All centrifuges and
related infrastructure will be placed under IAEA monitoring.
Iran will only enrich
uranium at the Natanz facility, with only 5,060 IR-1 first-generation
centrifuges for ten years.
* Iran has agreed to only
enrich uranium using its first generation (IR-1 models) centrifuges
at Natanz for ten years, removing its more advanced centrifuges.
* Iran will remove the 1,000
IR-2M centrifuges currently installed at Natanz and place them in
IAEA monitored storage for ten years.
* Iran will not use its
IR-2, IR-4, IR-5, IR-6, or IR-8 models to produce enriched uranium
for at least ten years. Iran will engage in limited research and
development with its advanced centrifuges, according to a schedule
and parameters which have been agreed to by the P5+1.
* For ten years, enrichment
and enrichment research and development will be limited to ensure a
breakout timeline of at least 1 year. Beyond 10 years, Iran will
abide by its enrichment and enrichment R&D plan submitted to the
IAEA, and pursuant to the JCPOA, under the Additional Protocol
resulting in certain limitations on enrichment capacity.
Inspections and
Transparency
* The IAEA will have regular
access to all of Iran’s nuclear facilities, including to Iran’s
enrichment facility at Natanz and its former enrichment facility at
Fordow, and including the use of the most up-to-date, modern
monitoring technologies.
* Inspectors will have
access to the supply chain that supports Iran’s nuclear program.
The new transparency and inspections mechanisms will closely monitor
materials and/or components to prevent diversion to a secret program.
* Inspectors will have
access to uranium mines and continuous surveillance at uranium mills,
where Iran produces yellowcake, for 25 years.
* Inspectors will have
continuous surveillance of Iran’s centrifuge rotors and bellows
production and storage facilities for 20 years. Iran’s centrifuge
manufacturing base will be frozen and under continuous surveillance.
* All centrifuges and
enrichment infrastructure removed from Fordow and Natanz will be
placed under continuous monitoring by the IAEA
* A dedicated procurement
channel for Iran’s nuclear program will be established to monitor
and approve, on a case by case basis, the supply, sale, or transfer
to Iran of certain nuclear-related
and dual use materials and technology – an additional transparency
measure.
* Iran has agreed to
implement the Additional Protocol of the IAEA, providing the IAEA
much greater access and information regarding Iran’s nuclear
program, including both declared and undeclared facilities.
* Iran will be required to
grant access to the IAEA to investigate suspicious sites or
allegations of a covert enrichment facility, conversion facility,
centrifuge production facility, or yellowcake production facility
anywhere in the country.
* Iran has agreed to
implement Modified Code 3.1 requiring early notification of
construction of new facilities.
* Iran will implement an
agreed set of measures to address the IAEA’s concerns regarding the
Possible Military Dimensions (PMD) of its program.
Reactors and Reprocessing
* Iran has agreed to
redesign and rebuild a heavy water research reactor in Arak, based on
a design that is agreed to by the P5+1, which will not produce
weapons grade plutonium, and which will support peaceful nuclear
research and radioisotope production.
* The original core of the
reactor, which would have enabled the production of significant
quantities of weapons-grade plutonium, will be destroyed or removed
from the country.
* Iran will ship all of its
spent fuel from the reactor out of the country for the reactor’s
lifetime.
* Iran has committed
indefinitely to not conduct reprocessing or reprocessing research and
development on spent nuclear fuel.
* Iran will not accumulate
heavy water in excess of the needs of the modified Arak reactor, and
will sell any remaining heavy water on the international market for
15 years.
* Iran will not build any
additional heavy water reactors for 15 years.
Sanctions
* Iran will receive
sanctions relief, if it verifiably abides by its commitments.
* U.S. and E.U.
nuclear-related sanctions will be suspended after the IAEA has
verified that Iran has taken all of its key nuclear-related steps. If
at any time Iran fails to fulfill its commitments, these sanctions
will snap back into place.
* The architecture of U.S.
nuclear-related sanctions on Iran will be retained for much of the
duration of the deal and allow for snap-back of sanctions in the
event of significant non-performance.
* All past UN Security
Council resolutions on the Iran nuclear issue will be lifted
simultaneous with the completion, by Iran, of nuclear-related actions
addressing all key concerns (enrichment, Fordow, Arak, PMD, and
transparency).
* However, core provisions
in the UN Security Council resolutions – those that deal with
transfers of sensitive technologies and activities – will be
re-established by a new UN Security Council resolution that will
endorse the JCPOA and urge its full implementation. It will also
create the procurement channel mentioned above, which will serve as a
key transparency measure. Important restrictions on conventional arms
and ballistic missiles, as well as provisions that allow for related
cargo inspections and asset freezes, will also be incorporated by
this new resolution.
* A dispute resolution
process will be specified, which enables any JCPOA participant, to
seek to resolve disagreements about the performance of JCPOA
commitments.
* If an issue of significant
non-performance cannot be resolved through that process, then all
previous UN sanctions could be re-imposed.
* U.S. sanctions on Iran for
terrorism, human rights abuses, and ballistic missiles will remain in
place under the deal
Phasing
* For ten years, Iran will
limit domestic enrichment capacity and research and development –
ensuring a breakout timeline of at least one year. Beyond that, Iran
will be bound by its longer-term enrichment and enrichment research
and development plan it shared with the P5+1.
* For fifteen years, Iran
will limit additional elements of its program. For instance, Iran
will not build new enrichment facilities or heavy water reactors and
will limit its stockpile of enriched uranium and accept enhanced
transparency procedures.
* Important inspections and
transparency measures will continue well beyond 15 years. Iran’s
adherence to the Additional Protocol of the IAEA is permanent,
including its significant access and transparency obligations. The
robust inspections of Iran’s uranium supply chain will last for 25
years.
* Even after the period of
the most stringent limitations on Iran’s nuclear program,
Iran will remain a party
to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which prohibits Iran’s
development or acquisition of nuclear
weapons and requires IAEA safeguards on its nuclear program.
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Since Iran never had any plans to develop the weapons in the first place, so it seems like a good deal.....At least it is a mean for the West to keep its face and retreat from its unreasonable demands, after all the wanton reproaches, ungrounded accusations and made up speculations ...... and Iran to stay on the course it wanted to pursue from the beginning, namely mastering the nuclear fuel cycle !!!... The period of sanctions simply accelerated Iran's scientific advances......Even the apparent freezing of a few points here and there motioned above is no strategic handicap, since these features and techniques would not be needed or come into consideration for at least a decade from now.... The logic is simple, sometimes buying a certain kind of fuel or radio medicine is much cheaper than producing it... Honestly, who in their right mind would give up the capacity and ability to produce 50.000 KW hours of electricity with 1 KG of natural Uranium... well done Iran.
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