The BBC Persian Service IV (By Dr. M. Torfeh)

From the mid-60 to mid-70 the Shah was increasingly regarded as an
unrivalled ambitious dictator, a devoted ally of the US and benefiting
excellent relations with the international community. Iran was portrayed
in the western press as enjoying full prosperity and economic growth. His
ambitions took him so far as to begin to plan the well-known costly
celebrations of 2500 anniversary of monarchy in Iran. The Iranian
Ambassador to the UK, Parviz Radji, writes in the introduction to his
book “In the Service of the Peacock Throne”:
“Indeed the Shah saw the 1973 boom in oil prices – for which he
was the prime mover – as the moment to realize his grand vision of
Iran, as a grand force to be reckoned with economically as well as
militarily. Massive expenditure was taken beyond the human or
infrastructural capacity of the country. These were the seeds of the
gigantic economic dislocation that was to become increasingly
apparent after 1976.”48
Movements against the Shah were growing both inside Iran and in the
West. These included from the most extreme left and underground
movements to the religious clergy and the National Front. The
International Confederation of Iranian Students had become organized
across Europe, especially in France, Germany and in the UK. Shah’s trips
to Europe were often an opportunity for the Students Confederation to
illustrate its growing power. As such the Shah often faced student
demonstrations and personal attacks when he traveled abroad.
Lutfali Khonji, a veteran Persian Service broadcaster who joined the BBC
in 1968, says all details of these demonstrations were given in BBC
broadcasts and there were no restrictions on reporting anti-Shah slogans
in broadcasts despite the amicable relations between the UK and the
Shah. He says he never had any personal experience of being told what to
say or which line to take although he was one of the main news editors,
then known as “program assistant.” But he adds that the program assistant
was not writing the original reports, news or analysis.
“News items were -- and still are -- prepared in the Central
Newsroom of the BBC and the analysis was written by British
reporters. The program assistant only had the task of translating
and broadcasting from English to Persian. Amongst the talkswriters
were Evan Charlton and Squire Barraclough. If there was
48 Parviz Radji, In the Service of the Peacock Throne, Hamish Hamilton Publishers 1983, p 8
any pressure to be born, it may have been on Newsroom editors or
the so-called “talks writers.” In my experience, the BBC would
never impose any line on any of its staff.”49
However, individual managers, reporters or analysts could be persuaded
to toe a particular line, Mr. Khonji believes. Persuasion rather than force
on individuals rather than on the system as a whole is the only possibility
of influencing the news and analysis in the BBC according to Lutfali
Khonji.
He says that it would be accurate to say that at times of crisis the program
durations would always be increased by 15 minutes and with that the
budget of the Service would go up. In response to a question about the
relative lack of importance of the BBC during the 60’s and early 70’s –
when the Shah was most powerful – Khonji says:
“That’s because there was nothing important to report in Iran
during the 60’s. Whatever there was to report, was reported -- such
as the huge demonstrations against the Shah in Germany in late
60’s or the case of someone standing up in the UN General
Assembly in mid 70’s calling the Shah “a murderer.” There was
little opposition and thus little newsworthy to report during the
years after the US led coup of 1953 through to early 70’s.”50
The only unusual incident, according to Mr. Khonji was:
“The Persian broadcasts would always play the Iranian national
anthem when it was the Shah’s birthday. This is very unusual for
the BBC WS and begs the question why and whether this was to
appease the Shah?”51.
Another veteran broadcaster, Majid Massoudi, says during this period the
Shah used to listen to broadcasts and was putting pressure on the BBC.
“Iranian intelligence ministry and other related organizations
always listened to our program with diligence. Whenever we said
something tiny that they considered anti Iranian they used to
complain. We were always under pressure of such criticism.”52
49 Interview with M. Torfeh
50 Ibid
51 Ibid
52 (BBC Persian Service Archive, 65th anniversary of the Persian Service, Shahryar Radpoor.)
Massoudi says inside the Service too, there were discussions about how
to refer to the Shah. Some preferred Shahanshah [King of kings], others
Alihazrat [His Highness] and others who preferred the Shah.
“There were always discussions on using official titles such as
Alihazartat, or Shahanshah, or just saying Iran’s Shah. But this
annoyed the Shah to a great extent.”53
Khonji confirms the constant pressure put on the BBC by the Shah:
“In Germany in 1968 for 3-4 days there was a lot of anti Shah
demonstrations culminating in a huge demonstration in Berlin. We
reported all these and the Shah did not like this at all.”54
Massoudi says we reported both sides of the story. In 1967 when the
BBC Persian service was allowed by the Shah for the first time to send an
Iranian reporter, Fazlullah Nikaiin, to report on the celebrations for his
coronation, much of his broadcast was an appraisal of the Shah then
referred to as Shahanshah:
“I daresay Iranians have never taken part in such a united mass
celebrations. Other than the pageantry, these celebrations are for
showing gratitude to the crowned leader of Iran, Shahahnshah, in
one of the most stable, most important, and most decisive moments
of Iran’s history.” 55
But when a BBC English reporter, John Birdman, went to Iran and
portrayed in his report poverty in Iran close to the pageantry, Shah
ordered his deportation.
On the other hand the Queen, who had invited the Shah of Iran prior to
the celebration of 2500 anniversary of monarchy, she praised him for his
role:
“The traditions and culture of your historic land have long been the
object of our admiration. Its traditions are exemplified in the
coming celebrations of 2500 years of monarchy in Iran.”56
53 (Ibid)
54 (Ibid)
55 (Ibid)
56 (Ibid)
3. The Persian Service and the Islamic Revolution of 1979
The BBC Persian Service rose to unprecedented prominence in the years
leading to the Islamic Revolution of 1979. Recalling the lead up to the
Revolution of 1979, Khonji says:
“At this stage there was a lot to report since opposition was
gathering momentum and they were contacting us in the BBC with
news. It was not just the Islamic activists but also the National
Front and left activists of a variety of colors. They would call us
daily giving us details of demonstrations, gatherings and their
political statements. So we had a lot to report.”57
By this time several new staff was recruited including Baqer Moin who
later in 1992 became the first Iranian head of the Service. Shadab Vajdi,
Sharan Tabari, Solmaz Dabiri, Fereydoon Jahed and Shahryar Radpoor
were amongst other main program assistants.
One of the common assertions amongst Iranians who were anti-Islamic
Revolution is that the BBC would tend to be ahead of the news in Iran. It
is asserted that the BBC would announce demonstrations before they
were announced in Iran. I asked Mr. Khonji why the listeners had such
impressions.
Khonji said
“Those working in the BBC had their own set of contacts. I was
the main link for the National Front and as such my friends would
pass on the relevant news on developments. Improved
communications techniques meant that the BBC could be heard far
better in Europe and through the BBC broadcasts and the Iranian
Diaspora were increasingly involved in the struggle for democracy
in Iran. Another element that increased news coverage was that the
BBC dispatched several reporters to Iran and thus could report
from various corners of the country on developments. That meant
the volume of incoming news was suddenly drastically increased.
New methods of broadcasting such as interviews were allowed.
Despite this there were only a few major interviews and the senior
British managers did not feel too happy about these since they
could not follow the contents. In the one year leading to the
revolution, there was only one interview with Khomeini, three or
57 Interview with M. Torfeh
four with Shapur Bakhtiar and two with Abdulkarim Sanjabi, who
led the National Front activists.”58
Khonji recalls a personal story when with great difficulty he managed to
get an appointment for interviewing the leader of the revolution,
Ayatollah Khomeini.
“At the time interviewing was done with great technical difficulty.
We had to book studios and lines. I also had to speak to several
contacts before convincing them of the justifications for the
interview. Nevertheless, soon after arriving in the studio, Mark
Dodd, the head of BBC WS arrived in the studio. I don’t even
know who had informed him that I was doing this interview. He
barred me from interviewing and said we should not “artificially
blowing the events out of proportion”59
Mr. Khonji uses this as an example to reject the common belief that the
BBC was supporting the Islamic revolution in Iran. However, there is the
possibility that Mark Dodd’s assertion was made under pressure from the
Iranian Embassy in London, which by then was growing increasingly
furious with the BBC broadcasts as we will see below. He recalls that
after about three weeks, Mark Dodd did allow the interview with
Khomeini but the interviewer was a colleague who was against the
Islamic revolution.
The contact that made the interview with Khomeini possible, Abulhassan
Banisadr, says that the distrust of the BBC from the old days of the crisis
still persisted. He says Khomeini was not at all convinced that he should
give the interview to the BBC:
“I suggested to Khomeini to give an interview to BBC assuring
him that they will broadcast exactly what he says. Khomeini
rejected saying “BBC belongs to the British and it will not benefit
us to give them an interview”. I convinced him when I said all the
other media you give interviews to, are also all foreign so what is
the difference. Khomeini then accepted.”60
58 Ibid
59 ibid
60 (BBC Persian Service Archives, program for the 65th anniversary of the Service, produced by
Shahryar Radpoor)
Asked about the opinion of staff at the time prior to the revolution,
Khonji says it was a true reflection of the Iranian society at home and
abroad. He claims about 80% of the staff were supporting the revolution
and only 20% were against it. He explains that the reason for the
popularity of BBC could have been the following:
1. Communication between the BBC staff and opposition was crucial.
2. Radio Iran was on strike and the BBC became the only source of
information.
3. Opposition became far more active than any other time in the
history of Iran.
4. Means of communications were far better.
5. BBC itself was by this time far more open to change and open
broadcasting with more confidence and a far more assertive
position vis-à-vis the UK Government.
6. The force of the movement was creating change inside the Persian
Service.61
Despite these, Khonji rejects the assertion strongly that the British
Government was pro the revolution or used the BBC for furthering that
aim. He says there was never any push or force on any member of the
staff. Other BBC staff such as Solmaz Dabiri and Shahran Tabari
acknowledges the same.
However, all Iranian supporters of the Shah regard the BBC’s role most
skeptically. In a revealing account of Shah’s perception of events in “The
Shah’s Story” published in 1980 by Michael Joseph Ltd., he accuses the
mass media of playing an important role in the unfolding of events in Iran
during the last three years that led to the revolution. He says,
“The composition of journalists in search of ever more sensational
news has led to the most regrettable excesses.”62
He singles out the rise in price of petrol as being the main cause of
international anger with his policies:
“I can imagine the anger of the Western motorist whose petrol cost
more or for whom there was a shortage. He was told it’s the Shah’s
fault and he believed it.” 63
61 Interview with M.Torfeh
62 “The Shah’s Story” published in 1980 by Michael Joseph Ltd, p161.
63 Ibid.
He even blames Libyan finances for having instigated the student’s
movement. He says:
“A very active subversive campaign was aimed at our students at
home and abroad… I am told that this subversion was subsidized
by Libyan funds amounting to 250 million dollars.” 64
The Shah goes on to blame the BBC in the same tone:
“No less surprising was the BBC’s attitude. From the beginning of
1978 their Persian language broadcasts consisted of virulent attacks
against my regime. It was as though some mysterious conductor
had given the go ahead to these attacks. I am not mentioning the
attitude of certain special envoys that caused certain deplorable
incidents to be magnified out of all proportion. I am tempted to
say that, for some newspapers a dead body is a godsend, and I
think that some newsagents must have made a fortune out of the
events in Iran.” 65
The US Ambassador to Iran, William Sullivan, records in his book
Mission to Iran, how the Shah regularly used to complain about the BBC.
He says that in August 1978, just a few months before the revolution and
during the time of martial law, the Shah became especially suspicious and
related BBC broadcasts to the question of oil negotiations between the
UK and Iran and claimed they resembled “ancient British subversions” in
Iran: Sullivan, William H., “Mission to Iran, WW Norton &company,
USA, 1981,
“He [the Shah] pointed out the negotiations with the oil consortium
were currently underway and that this gave the British antagonists
all the excuses they needed to attempt the resumption of their
ancient subversions in Iran. In listening to the BBC broadcasts that
were critical of his Government, he was, he said, confirmed in this
analysis.” 66
The Iranian Ambassador to the UK, Parviz Radji, catalogues in his book
“In the Service of the Peacock Throne” (Hamish Hamilton Publishers
1983) in his memoirs covering June 1976 to end of January 1979, the
number of times meetings took place between him and the Managing
Director of BBC External Services as well as Ian Trethowan, the Director
64 Ibid (P162)
65 (Ibid p163)
66 William H. Sullivan, Mission to Iran, WW Norton & Co, USA, 1981, pp156-7.
General of BBC and Mark Dodd, Head of BBC’s Eastern Service. It is
clear from these accounts that the Shah is cabling frequently his anger at
BBC Persian Service’s reporting. Radji claims that, as the Ambassador he
would often try to tone down the anger in Teheran and persuade the Shah
that it would not be appropriate to make direct complaints to the BBC,
explaining this would make matters worse and give more credit to the
BBC. His recollection of a meeting on October 4, 1977 reveals the form
of discussions that took place between top BBC officials and the
embassy:
“Ian Trethowan, the new Director-General of the BBC comes to
lunch bringing with him Gerald Mansell, Robert Gregson and
Mark Dodd…Mansell says if a story gets taken up nationally he
doesn’t see how the BBC can stay out of it. Dodd says BBC
needn’t stay out of it, but that if they should decide to give the
matter coverage, the views of the embassy should also be
expressed. I say that’s all I ask for. I then say that on my arrival in
London, I had found three main problem areas: the BBC, amnesty
International and the press.” 67
Radji illustrates in the account of his meetings that the anger is persistent
and as we get closer to the revolution, the matter gets out of hand.
According to his account, various members of the Iranian Government
who want to express complaints to the BBC are told that the BBC acts
independently. They are even frequently taken around to BBC to see
how BBC’s newsroom operates and how the Persian broadcasters are
translating the news. The go-betweens were trying to illustrate to Iranian
officials that there can be no Government pressure on the BBC. The
account of 19 April 1978 reads as follows:
“The [Foreign Ministers] session breaks up and David Owen walks
up to me followed by Khalatbari, who raises the vexed subject of
the BBC. He confesses to be puzzled as to why “the BBC is more
anxious to broadcast the views of the opponents of your friends
than the views of your friends.” The Foreign Secretary laughingly
says, “I agree with everything you say, but there isn’t anything I
can do about it,” again insisting on the BBC’s independence from
the Foreign Office.” 68
67 Parviz Radji, In the Service of the Peacock Throne, Hamish Hamilton Publishers
1983, p111)
68 (Ibid, p167)