The BBC Persian Service III (By Dr. M. Torfeh)

The Persian Service and Oil Nationalization
After the war had ended, a period of reform and democratization ensued
in Iran and with the departure of Reza Shah; the parliament became
increasingly a major centre of decision-making. Political parties were
formed each with their dedicated fractions inside the parliament, and
often with their own preferences about foreign powers by now
constituting the British, the Russians and the Americans. Although the
British had their own parliamentary support, they were going through
perhaps the worst period of their relations with Iran in as far as being out
of favor with the majority of reformists.
Foreign Office documents indicate clearly the tension in diplomatic
exchanges and the type of adverse publicity they had to face in the
Iranian press. The details are outside the boundary of this research but
the main reasons for strong anti-British sentiment included the role they
had played in occupying the southern ports in 1940, the removing from
power of Reza Shah, but most importantly their constant attempts at
blocking the process of nationalization of Iranian oil – a subject very
much on the agenda for the reformists and their leader, Dr. Mossadeq.
Throughout the 40’s the British Government had problems persuading the
Iranian Government to continue with its exceptional concessions on oil to
the Anglo Iranian Oil Company. The British were pointing to the
agreement which had been signed with the Anglo Iranian Oil Company in
1933 whereby according to article 21:“This Concession shall not be
annulled by the Persian Government and the terms therein contained shall
not be altered.” The reformist movement and the National Front Party of
Dr. Mossadeq – by now the Prime Minister of Iran in 1951-- thought
otherwise. Mussadeq often referred to a clause in the same agreement that
spoke about activities being in the interest of Iran. The National Front
newspaper, Keshvar, had a lead article directly addressing the British
Prime Minister in the weeks running to the vote on the nationalization of
oil:
“How can Mr. Atlee have the right of nationalizing British heavy
industries and we cannot have the right to nationalize our oil
industry? Mr. Furlong [the British Foreign Office representative
visiting Iran at the time] must tell high authorities including Mr.
Eden that Persians are no longer prepared to come to any
compromise with the Anglo Iranian Oil Company. In fact the
company is now detested by the Persian people.” 30
30 (FO371/91523, 16 February 1951)
At this stage there is a revealing document relating to the way the BBC
was brought in to help. On the 1st of March 1951, Mr. Furlong writes to
Mr. Serpel at the Treasury and Mr. Butler at the Ministry of Fuel and
Power suggesting a BBC talk on the subject.
“Sir Francis Shepherded [of the UK embassy in Teheran] has
suggested, and we agree, that it would be useful to inspire the
BBC’s Persian Service at this present stage in the oil question…I
enclose a draft memorandum bringing out the points we feel can
usefully be made in this context. They are cast in such a way that
nationalization is not, and cannot be a purely internal Persian
problem. They are also designed to show the impracticality of
nationalization and the financial and other losses which any such
move may involve.”31
The memorandum suggests seven lines of argument -- including the
financial losses, the harm to Iranian reputation internationally, the
adverse effects on the industry -- all of which are later picked up in a
BBC talk published three days later on 4 March – just a day before the
voting taking place in the parliament. Parts of the talk read as follows:
“In the first place it must be remembered that the Anglo-Iranian oil
company has invested vast sums of money…the arbitrary
cancellation of the oil Agreement and the failure to honor an
international agreement would seriously damage Persian credit and
reputation in the world, more so if … it would be difficult to see
how Persia thinks of paying a huge sum to which an international
tribunal would certainly consider the company entitled… and there
is the company’s expenditure of tens of millions of pounds...”32
A report prepared by the BBC for the House of Commons Foreign Affairs
Committee on 13 February 2001 acknowledges that Iranians did not rust
the BBC at either conjuncture:
“The BBC Persian Service's broadcasts to Iran started on 28
December 1940 to counter the influence of German Radio in
Persian from Berlin. The BBC's initial output was a modest hour
per week centered on war news. In 1941, the allies entered Iran and
removed from power the then pro-German nationalist Shah, Reza
31 (FO371-91523/EP1531/68
32 [full text in FO371/91524/EP1531/122 Nationalization of Oil by BBC Diplomatic Correspondent]
Pahlavi, replacing him with his young son, Mohammad Reza
Pahlavi. The BBC's reports on the Shah's cruelty and corruption
were seen as a prelude to his departure. From the very outset,
therefore, many in Iran regarded the BBC as an instrument of
British imperial involvement. This was particularly true in the case
of the young Shah himself. When Britain and the US supported the
Shah's coup against the democratically elected Prime Minister, Dr
Mossadeq, in August 1953, many nationalists criticized the BBC's
broadcasts for playing a key pro-Shah and anti-Mossadeq role.”33
The British Government tried to forestall further Mossadeq action by a
quick request to the international court of justice in Hague asking for an
interim injunction calling upon the Persian Government not to prejudice
the position of the AIOC. BBC reporting of Mossadeq’s appeal to the
UN against the AIOC angered many Iranians who considered it to be
biased. In a memo entitled the “line for News Department and the BBC”
on the possible failure of negotiation the British Embassy in Teheran
suggests the following points. These points, written out in full detail,
were given to the BBC following a briefing at the Foreign Office at 5:30
on 19 March 1953. It included the following lines:
1. Minimum comment
2. Stress that Mossadeq has rejected a fair and equitable
settlement
3. Stress that the proposal was Anglo-US
4. Joint work was requested by Mossadeq
5. Mossadeq’s speech offered inaccurate information on
compensation figure and revenues
6. No question of undue burden on the economy of Persia
7. No comment on counter proposals
8. Avoid issuing the text of Compensation Agreement…”34
Whatever the way this opposition to Mossadeq was conveyed, it seems to
have left the impression with many Iranians that the BBC was working in
close cooperation with the Government. Abulhassan Bani Sadr, at the
time a close advisor to Mossadeq says in a BBC interview broadcast for
the 65th anniversary of the Service:
“BBC was the voice of British Imperialism and we did not trust
it.”35
33 www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200001/cmselect/cmfaff/80/80ap01.htm
34 (FO371/7188633-EP1531/228)
Shahrokh Golestan says in the same series:
“BBC broadcasts contained frequent attacks on Mossadeq’s
Government. The analysis was always one sided. There were two
Englishmen who used to write the analysis. I can’t remember their
names. They constantly rejected Mossadeq’s policies as being
inadequate. I remember that their reports always ended by this
sentence: the adverse effects will most probably be for Iran.”36
Elwell-Sutton writing in Persian Oil also treats the BBC commentary
skeptically:
“From London where the BBC had doubled and trebled its
transmissions in the Persian language, Persians were told that the
British staff [of AIOC] would leave if the company was not given
its way. And if this happened the oil industry would collapse. And
if the oil industry collapsed, listeners were warned, Persia’s
economic system would collapse too.”37
Elwell-Sutton adds that Teheran radio was resorting equally to
propaganda material attacking the British Ambassador daily. So,
emotions were running high on the issue of oil nationalization. It caused
splits amongst British writers as well as Iranians. Norman Kemp, who
calls himself “a regular Abadan reporter,” says in his book “Abadan” that
suddenly there was a surge of journalists going to Iran.
“Colin Reid, Walter Farr and Peter Webb, British United Press
reporter, White and myself as regulars from the Abadan corps;
soon to be reinforced with Douglas Willis, of the BBC. Alan
Clarke of London’s Daily Herald, John Fisher of Kemsley Group,
Bob Long, Associated Press of America, Flora Lewis of London’s
Observer and her husband Sydney Gruson of the New York Times,
Homer Bigart, Politzer-winner of the New York Herald-Tribune,
Jacques Marcus of the AFP, and newsreel cameraman Robert
35 BBC Persian Service Archives, program for the 65th Anniversary of the Persian Service, produced
by Shahryar Radpoor.
36 Ibid
37 (L.P. Elwell-Sutton, Persian Oil, A Study in Power Politics, Lawrence & Wishard Ltd, 1955, pp241-
2)
Hecox were among correspondents who sailed to Abadan during
weeks of lax political tension in the capital.”38
This sudden surge of adverse international reporting on Mossadeq had its
effect on the BBC Persian Service broadcasters. Manuchehr Anvar, one
of the Persian broadcasters recalls in an interview with the Persian
Service that:
“They always told us what to say and how to say it. When it came
to reporting adversely on Mossadeq suddenly for two weeks all
Iranian broadcasters disappeared. They had no choice but to bring
in English people who spoke Persian, because Iranians had gone on
strike. The broadcasts were all in a Persian with a strong English
accent.” 39
A veteran BBC Persian Service broadcaster, Abbas Dehghan, says in his
interview with the Persian Service to mark the 65th anniversary of the
Persian Service that although the broadcasts were mainly translations of
British analysis and even the satire and cultural programs were written by
the British and translated by the Persian broadcasters, the situation was
different when it came to Mossadeq:
“No Iranian was prepared to say anything against Mossadeq.
Nobody would be disrespectful of Mossadeq.” 40
Elwell Sutton takes the side of BBC Persian broadcasters:
“This radio propaganda was every bit as offensive…No wonder the
BBC’s Persian announcers on several occasions patriotically
refused to speak the lines handed to them! British propaganda
services, on instructions from the Eastern Department of the
Foreign Office, attempted to whitewash Britain’s record in Persia
by plugging the work of British scholars in the Persian
language…”41
Norman Kemp puts it in a different form but conveys the same:
38 (Norman Kemp, Abadan, A first-hand Account of the Persian Oil Crisis, first published 1953 by
Allan Wingate (Publishers), PP144-5)
39 (BBC Persian Service Archives, 65th Anniversary of the BBC Persian Service, Produced by
Shahryar Radpoor)
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid
“The Company’s [AIOC] information Department was intended to
propagate details of its operations and purposes in Iran, a task
which achieved indifferent success in overcoming the hurdle of
emotional Persian nationalism.”42
Norman Kemp in his account of this crisis period how tension between
the UK and Iran was seeping down to journalists:
“The British loss in Abadan has been described as “a tragedy of
public relations.” The Company had reckoned too much on, and
waited too long for, Persian Governments to tell the Iranian people
of the AIOC’s offers. Persian journalists, with connivance of their
Government, could be scurrilously biased in their invective….
Officially there was no censorship but the Government watched the
press dispatches secretively and occasionally was disposed to delay
transmission if a piece did not meet with approval. Mossadeq
shrewdly divined that by splitting his news sources, he could gain
greater publicity for his achievements to the confusion of the
journalists.”43
He speaks in detail about the technical difficulties of getting news out of
Abadan with problems with communication lines, telephones and
exchanges and how the press received information.
“There was a pattern for news coverage in Abadan. First a
conference with [Eric] Drake, [Oil Board] between nine and ten
o’clock in the morning; then we wrote the stories in a small
[AIOC] Company office adjoining the administrative block. A
Persian staff clerk hired for us a taxi…which was sent to the
frontier…local fishermen paddled the copy across the Shatt-el-
Arab river at the border … then another taxi arranged buy AIOC
carried it to … and then to Basra telegraph office. Once we had
sent the reports we met the Oil Board… and for greater depths to
news reporters interviewed privately the British Government and
company officials and the Persian cabinet.”44
It is clear from this account that the bulk of information for Western
media was provided by the AIOC, the British Government and embassy
officials and the Persian press was mainly fed by Iranians officials
42 (Ibid p146)
43 (Ibid pages 146-7)
44 Ibid
thereby causing the split in reporting and the resulting mutual distrust.
The BBC Persian Service had both points of view under one roof and this
must have been behind the strike by some of the staff. Norman Kemp
speaks about the important role that the BBC played in giving
information to Iranians.
“The Persian authorities had suspended the Company’s [AIOC]
daily newspaper, and each afternoon and evening the oilmen
huddled around radio sets to listen to BBC overseas broadcasts for
up-to-date information. If Abadan or Teheran were not mentioned
in the bulletins the staff was despondent, believing the omission
was an augury of defeat.”45
Nevertheless the pro-nationalization majority did not always trust the
Persian Service’s broadcasts. At the height of the crisis, when the US
Government begins to mediate between Iran and UK, Hussein Makki, the
trusted right hand man of Mussadeq takes the opportunity to attack the
British conduct. On 7 August 1951 when as a member of the Oil Board
he accompanied the US President’s representative, Averell Harriman, to
see the squalid conditions in the Persian oil workers living quarters in
Abadan, Makki referred in his speech with suspicion to the BBC.
“Should the Mussadeq Government suffer defeat, Soviet
propaganda will convince the people that only with Russian aid can
the Iranians succeed. It is in this that the greatest danger lays. The
desire of the British capitalist is that nationalization should fail,
they are shareholders in the AIOC and they are trying in every
possible way and through underhand methods to bring down the
Mussadeq Government. This is being done with the aid of the
Persian-language broadcasts and the commentaries of the BBC, by
inspired and biased articles in the British press…”46
In June 1951, while Mossadeq’s Government was preparing to take
control of Iran’s oil industry and Britain was once again deploying
military force in the Persian Gulf, the Foreign Office gave extra funding
for half an hours’ extra broadcast. The British Embassy in Teheran had
asked for an extra 15 minutes. This was done in the form of an increase
in the evening broadcasts becoming 45 minutes rather than 15 minutes
and an additional 15 minutes afternoon broadcast. The latter was then
45 (Ibid, p208)
46 (Ibid, p198)
dropped after 27 August 1951 when Britain had given up plans for the
military invasion of Iran.
A report prepared by the BBC for the House of Commons Foreign Affairs
Committee on 13 February 2001 acknowledges that Iranians did not rust
the BBC at either conjuncture:
“From the very outset, therefore, the BBC was regarded by many
in Iran as an instrument of British imperial involvement. This was
particularly true in the case of the young Shah himself. When
Britain and the US supported the Shah's coup against the
democratically elected Prime Minister, Dr Mossadeq, in August
1953, many nationalists criticized the BBC's broadcasts for playing
a key pro-Shah and anti-Mossadeq role.”47
The Era of Perceived Prosperity
After the turbulent years of 1951-53, there followed a period of relative
calm. The young Shah of Iran, supported by the US and UK, was brought
back to the throne. In the years that followed, large US military
investment in Iran enabled the Shah of Iran to establish his power by
early 60’s. In 1963 he embarked on his “White Revolution.”
However, excessive reliance on foreign borrowing to feed the Seven Year
Plan for economic development and escalating military expenditure had
caused financial crisis forcing Iran to borrow heavily from the IMF,
which in turn had asked for reforms in the way of trimming the budget,
freezing wage rises and shelving some development projects. This
became another cause for tension and opposition, this time led mainly by
a powerful clergy but also involving National Front members.
In June 1963 there were massive demonstrations during the holy month
of Ramadan led mainly by Ayatollah Khomeini, then 64 years of age.
Thousands of shopkeepers, clergymen, teachers, Bazaar merchants and
students came out to denounce the Shah. The demonstrations lasted for
three days but left hundreds dead. The military kept its loyalty to the Shah
and he weathered the storm. The Shah ordered the arrest of National
Front members and deported Khomeini to Turkey from where he went to
Iraq.
47 Appendix 1, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200001/cmselect/cmfaff/80/80ap01.htm