The BBC Persian Service II (By Dr. M. Torfeh)

The BBC entered World War II unsure of its role. Britain was in a state of
total war with every resource focused on winning the battle against the
Axis powers. BBC archives recounts the story of the first days thus:
“Managers at the fledgling corporation debated whether the BBC
should report the conflict objectively - or contribute to the war
effort by broadcasting morale boosting propaganda. By the autumn
of 1940, Britain was suffering almost nightly bombardment from
German planes. On 15 October a delayed action bomb hit
Broadcasting House in London. It landed in the music library at
2010 GMT and exploded 52 minutes later, killing seven people.
Listeners to the Nine o'clock news heard the announcer pause, and
then continue reading.”3
In the summer of 1943 the BBC's two "War Reporting Units" – were set
up comprising of teams of seven containing a mixture of reporters,
producers and engineers. The BBC created the title War Correspondent
for Richard Dimbleby who covered World War II in Europe, Africa and
the Middle East. In the years that followed war reporting became a
specialist skill with new technical equipment and training which was
different in nature to the daily news reporting. Reporting needed to take
into consideration wartime security and intelligence requirements without
being propaganda.
The BBC reinvented itself during the Second World War and public
perception of the institution changed dramatically. It more than doubled
in size and adopted a new culture and outlook. But the biggest expansion
came early in 1940 and 1941, ahead of American involvement in the war,
when the outlook for Britain was bleakest. The Government asked the
BBC to increase its overseas effort three-fold. A special service for North
America was introduced, offering entertainment as well as news of the
British struggle. There were services in every major European language,
from Scandinavia to the Balkans, plus services for the Soviet Union,
Persia, India, Japan and many more. The War proved to be a tough test of
the BBC's independence. At times the Government and the military
wanted to use the BBC to counter crude propaganda from the Nazis, and
there was talk in Westminster of taking over the BBC.
3 http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/history/timeline.shtml
1. The Persian Service & Reza Shah
The BBC’s Persian Service was one of these specially created language
services when the British Government suspected the Iranian king, Reza
Shah Pahlavi, of having sympathies for Nazi Germany. Reza Shah had in
1923 in fact come to power with the support of the British Government
but declaring Iran neutral, he declined cooperation in the wartime. This
concerned the British Government that he may in fact be taking a pro-
Hitler position and could potentially block the Allied efforts in the East.
Reading the correspondence between the British Legation in Teheran and
the Foreign Office, it is clear that the war publicity was not working as
effectively as might have been expected and many Iranians were also
listening to Berlin Radio. The head of British Legation in Teheran, Sir
Reader Bullard, often wrote on the subject.
“The success of German Propaganda in Iran and the failure of the
British propaganda to make any headway against it have been
indicated frequently by the Press Attaché in her reports.”4
On 29 December 1939, Sir Reader Bullard had suggested the BBC might
have programs in Persian. The Foreign Office responds on 8 February
with a positive note from Lacey Baggallay of the Eastern Department:
“You will remember saying in your telegram of 29 December that
the Persian Government no longer deprecated the commencement
of broadcast in Persian from London…We therefore can ascertain
what provisions BBC had made for this eventuality…I understand
that Persian has now been moved high up on the list of languages
waiting attention and the Treasury will begin financial assistance to
BBC in this matter.”5
The first idea of an Iranian translator for the post can be seen in a memo
on 2 April 1940 when the Foreign Office asks the Legation in Teheran:
“In the event of decision to broadcast permanently in Persian, it
may be necessary to engage a second Iranian announcer capable of
translating English news bulletins. If so please indicate
approximate salary likely to be accepted. Hours of work will be
short.”6
4 (7 February 1741/FO371/E382/211/34)
5 (FO71/E2/2/34/24570)
6 (FO371/E1484/24570)
It is a Professor Rushbrook Williams who is consulted by the Foreign
Office on the arrangements for starting Persian broadcasts from the BBC.
On 13 June 1940 the Foreign Office suggests sending a professional
journalist to work alongside the Press Attaché in Teheran, Miss Anne
Lambton. 7
The very first head of the Persian Service is selected by Mr. Stevenson,
Head of the Eastern Service of the BBC as registered in the memo from
the Foreign Office to Sir Reader Bullard in Teheran:
“Mr. Stevenson of the BBC [director of the Eastern Service] called
on the Foreign Office on Friday 9 August to introduce Mr.
Gladdening who is to take charge of proposed BBC news
broadcasts in Persian. Mr. Stevenson said BBC was proceeding
with the recruitment of personnel. A number of Iranian students
have already been recruited for translation and Mr. Hamzavi of the
Iranian Legation was probably going to take charge of the actual
broadcasts.”8
It is interesting to note that the Ministry of Information would be
“contributing” to Mr. Hamzavi’s salary. The memo goes on:
“If this was possible, Ministry of Information would definitely
make a contribution to Hamzavi’s salary. Mr. Hamzavi had
himself undertaken to take leave from the Legation and Mr.
Stevenson considered him an ideal man for the broadcasts.”9
In the same memo we read that the BBC asks for guidance:
“BBC are anxious to seek our guidance on two points: 1) whether
the Minister needs to be present at the inauguration to deliver a
message? 2) The BBC would like to be given a line as to what
attitude they should adopt in their Persian broadcasts, e.g. what
subjects to avoid and what aspects of Iranian live to emphasize.”10
7 (FO 371/E842/2/34-24570)
8 (FO371/E2426/24570)
9 (Ibid)
10 (Ibid)
In a memorandum on 14 August 1940 entitled BBC Broadcasts in
Persian, the Foreign Office Eastern Department makes the following
points:
“It should in the first place be emphasized that the following
suggestions for the guidance of the BBC in the preparation of
material for the projected news broadcasts in the Persian language
are intended for the use of the regular British officials only and
they should not be shown or communicated to any Persian
speaking official.”11
The suggestions in this memorandum are that:
“It is to be hoped that these new broadcasts will be devoted to the
straight news of the world and that, while it is understood that the
Ministry of Information will supply news telegrams containing
items of more local interest, the broadcasts should as far as
possible avoid going into Middle Eastern political questions…if
some particular event requires clarifying or explanation, the
Foreign Office will always be willing to advise on the commentary
which the BBC would wish to add.”12
At this stage the request is that Reza Shah should be treated in these
broadcasts with due sensitivity and diplomacy because:
“The Shah is not a popular figure but he is still in complete control
and is likely to retain power. While gross flattery of his person or
his rule should be avoided, he should be presented as an energetic
modern-minded ruler, under whose rule Iran has made great
economic and cultural progress. Iran’s relations with His Majesty’s
Government are excellent. Emphasis might on suitable conditions
be laid on the long-standing traditional friendship between the two
countries…and care should be taken not to suggest that HM
Government has any influence whatsoever on Iranian policy.”13
In its very first broadcast on 29 December 1940, Hassan Movaghar-
Balyuzi, the new young presenter recruited from Iran follows that line
and introduces the BBC broadcasts as the dawning of a new era:
11 (FO371/24570)
12 (Ibid)
13 (Ibid)
“The BBC Persian Service is aiding a new relationship between the
two nations of Britain and Iran”. 14
In the first few months, BBC Persian Service broadcasts consisted of
short 15 minutes news bulletins of war only four nights a week.
Abulghassem Taheri, also just recruited from Tehran, reports that the
British Press welcomed the opening of the Persian Service as a step
towards better relations with Iran. 15
This line did not last very long. Over 1940-41, the British foreign Office
documents reveal that Britain becomes increasingly impatient with Reza
Shah over his lack of cooperation over the deportation of some 3000
Germans believed to be resident in Iran. Reza Shah kept on refusing on
grounds that the Germans were mainly engineers employed in his
modernization program and was refusing to deport them. However British
Intelligence had documents revealing that famous German spies, such as
Franz Mayer, were working in Iran. Indeed Franz Meyer had described in
a letter discovered by British Intelligence that southern mountainous
areas of Iran were a safe bastion for German military work:
“This is like a part of Germany or an unassailable allied state
behind the enemy’s lines in which you can do anything you wish,
train, recruit, and build landing ground, munitions dump and Uboat
bases.”16
On 7 August 1941, just prior to the Anglo Soviet invasion of Iran Sir
Reader Bullard writes in a “Most Secret” memo “Propaganda in Persia”:
“The question of propaganda against the Shah would be completely
altered in the case of Russian/British ultimatum, which was to be
followed by military action in a few days in the case of noncompliance.
To forestall the Germans and make prospect of
occupation more palatable we might simultaneously with the
ultimatum, release articles and wireless talks about Iran (Persia),
referring not only to the good points, but also to the great defects of
the present regime, e.g. compulsory acquisition of land at
dishonestly low prices, and the enormous cost of living. By then it
should be too late for the Shah to throw himself to the arms of the
14 (From BBC Persian Service Archives, 65th Anniversary program made by Shahryar Radpoor.)
15 (Ibid)
16 (Sir Anthony Eden to Sir Reader Bullard, 26 June 1941, FO371-35089/E5035.)
Germans, while the army which is anti-Shah would be encouraged
to turn against him rather than obey him.”17
Indeed on 22 August 1941 in a memo BBC Broadcasts in Persian, from
Sir Reader Bullard in Teheran to the Foreign Office the BBC line is
defined as follows:
“Tribute could be paid to the Shah as a soldier in early days but be
hinted that greediness and tyranny have made him a different
man…forcible acquisition of land, forced labor, general poverty
and corruption, acute shortage of water, Shah’s own wealth and
ownership of factories… his monopoly of all prices… his
involvement with opium trade… his bad treatment of soldiers…
weakness of the political structure…Constitution only in name, a
powerless parliament, dictated elections… could be highlighted.
Also it could be stressed that England has a democratic
Government whereas the Shah, like Hitler, thinks the people are
like sheep and are only fit to carry orders blindly.”18
Later, after the Anglo Soviet invasion of Iran, the British Foreign Office
documents show that the British find it impossible to work with Reza
Shah.
“His Majesty’s Government have no wish to interfere
unnecessarily in Persian internal affairs but it is clearly difficult for
them to operate fully with an administration that had long ceased to
represent the wishes of the people.”19
BBC Persian Service was then tasked with broadcasting items that
revealed Reza Shah’s autocratic style of leadership and encouraged
instead a republican system of Government:
“His Majesty’s Government now agreed that the BBC might begin
to give various broadcasts in Persian which had been prepared
beforehand, starting with talks on Constitutional Government an
increasing in strength and color until all Reza Shah’s
mismanagement, greed and cruelty were displayed to the public
gaze… encouraged by the lead given by the BBC, the deputies in
the Majlis, who had been subservient to the Shah for many years,
17 (FO371/28914/34/211)
18 (FO371/211/34/4902)
19 (Anthony Eden to British legation in Teheran, 9 September 1941, FO371-27213/EP5518.)
passed a resolution asking for reform… a deputation of them was
to wait upon the Shah and ask him to abdicate… and within 3
weeks the Shah abdicated.” 20
[When reflecting on the relations between Iran and UK, the head of
British legation to Iran, Sir Reader Bullard writes:
“On numerous occasions the Allies were unable to get even their
most essential military requirements without the application of the
strongest diplomatic pressure and once or twice the virtual threat of
force. We were obliged to interfere regularly and radically in the
local administration…There were times when we used to wonder
whether in the end we might not have to take over the country and
run it ourselves.”21
Shahrokh Golestan, a well-known film director, says in an interview with
the Persian service for the 65th anniversary of Persian broadcasts:
“I remember vividly that every evening we used to get together
with our neighbors to listen to the BBC Persian broadcasts. We all
used to sit in a circle in the garden and the radio -- which used to
be kept on the second floor – would be turned towards the garden
so we could all hear it. We listened every night, not just to the
BBC, but also to Radio Berlin to make sure we didn’t miss
anything.”22
The news bulletin was in fact written by the War Unit of the BBC and
translated to Persian and broadcast by the new Iranian recruits. It was
direct war reporting in the propaganda style of the day. The pressure by
the Government on the BBC World Service broadcasts is reflected in
BBC’s own account of wartime reporting:
“From the start, there was tension with the government as to how
much freedom should be allowed in wartime to the BBC radio
news operations and it took time to establish an effective method of
working between the BBC and the new Ministry of Information.
BBC staff were seconded to the Ministry - and so-called "vigilants"
20 (Cited in E.Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, Princeton, 1982, page 165)
21 (Sir Reader Bullard to the Foreign Office, “Annual Report for the Year 1942”, FO371—
35117/E239/34.)
22 (BBC Persian Service Archives, program for the 65th anniversary of the Persian Service by Shahryar
Radpoor.)
from the Ministry were on permanent duty in the newsroom, often
alongside representatives of the services."23
Apart from Movaghar-Balyuzi, the first recruits of the BBC Persian
Service also included the famous Iranian intellectual, Mojtaba Minovi,
who later became a distinguished scholar of Persian literature. Mojtaba
Minovi had come to Britain on a study tour, but had stayed on for the fear
of persecution in Reza Shah’s regime. He taught Persian at Oxford
University. Then Massoud Farzaad and a British scholar, Paul Elwell-
Sutton were also recruited to strengthen the broadcasts and ensure
accuracy of translation. Elwell Sutton had worked for the Anglo-Iranian
Oil Company AIOC. He later went on to write a passionate account in
favor of the oil nationalization by Iran as a lecturer at Edinburgh
University where he ended his career as professor of Iranian studies. 24
An influential politician of the era, Nassrollah Fatemi, recalls in his
interview with the BBC Persian Service that Reza Shah viewed the
Persian Service with strong suspicion:
“Reza Shah told the acting Foreign Minister, Ameri, that he should
listen to how the British were making decisions about his future.
Apparently Reza Shah had asked Ameri to listen to the BBC to
hear what the British opinion of his monarchy was. “It is saying I
will be gone soon,” Reza Shah told Ameri. The same evening the
BBC reported: “Reza Khan was brought by us but has now become
too arrogant. He has now turned into a dictator who is confiscating
public property.” I remember this clearly.” 25
According to Nassrollah Fatemi, the BBC was giving reports every
evening of Reza Shah’s cruelties. Abbas Dehghan, another journalist of
the first generation BBC reporters told the Persian Service in an interview
for the 65th anniversary of the Service that:
“We read exactly whatever we were given to read. We were not
allowed to make any changes. There were a couple of English
23 (http://news.bbc.co.uk/aboutbbcnews/spl/hi/history/html/default.stm)
24 Hussein Shahidi, The BBC Persian Service –60 years on: September 24, 2001.
25 (BBC Persian Service Archives, program for the 65th anniversary of the Persian Service by Shahryar
Radpoor.)
people who were monitoring what we broadcast. They spoke
Persian and they listened carefully.”26
By the year 1944, the British Government decided on new, more indirect
ways of using the BBC Persian broadcasts:
“These broadcasts carry more weight than statements made in our
local broadcasts in Persian and are listened to by a wider audience.
This approach would be more effective than supplying the Persian
press with material especially prepared for Persian consumption
which by the very nature of its presentation is likely to be treated
with suspicion.”27
The British Foreign Office decided on 10 February 1944 to raise the level
of British legation in Teheran to embassy and as a consequence Sir
Reader Bullard became the Ambassador. He wrote on 20 June 1944 to all
British Councils about a new indirect way of influencing politics in Iran:
“When action is taken by a Persian official as a result of persuasion
or pressure by a consular officer, the British delegations should, as
far as possible, be kept directly in the background and subordinate
officials and the public should be allowed and even encouraged to
believe that the Persian official acted on his own responsibility and
initiative.”28
Earlier, in April 1943, Bullard had already planned a wider propaganda
campaign through the extension of the activities of the British Council:
“Cultural propaganda is a field in which we have much leeway to
make up in Persia. Persian culture connections have been mainly
French… Under the late Shah the activity of the British Council
was very restricted…politically the extension of the British
Council should be valuable because they give us contact with the
younger generation and an opportunity to influence them in the
pro-British direction.”29
26 Ibid
27 (Sir Reader Bullard to Foreign Office, 9 June 1944, FO371-40194/E3248.)
28 (Sir Reader Bullard to all Councils in Iran, 20 June 1944, FO37140194/E3596)
29 (FO371/E2081/38/34)